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PROTECTION OF PEACEKEEPERS:
THE LEGAL REGIME
CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a sad fact of life that attacks on peacekeepers have been a fea-
ture of U.N. peacekeeping operations from the outset.' Concern about
such attacks has escalated in recent years following the particularly
heavy casualties suffered by peacekeepers in Somalia, the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This concern has led to an examination of
ways in which the protection given to peacekeepers can be enhanced
by a strengthening of the legal regime regarding their protection It
was in this context that the United Nations General Assembly, in De-
cember 1994, adopted the Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel (Safety Convention).' Scholars have argued
that more still needs to be done, especially as regards operations
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1. The attention given to recent loss of life in Somalia and former Yugoslavia has dis-
tracted attention away from the casualties suffered in earlier United Nations operations. For
example, amongst the operations established by the United Nations in its early years, the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which had a maximum strength of
572 at any one time, lost 24 personnel through hostile action and accidents. See UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 419 (2d ed. 1992), U.N. Doc. DPI/1065, U.N. Sales No.
E.85.I.16. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Middle East suffered 64 fa-
talities. See id. at 421. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) lost 195 person-
nel through hostile action and accidents. See id. at 435. More recently, the United Nations In-
terim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL) had lost 130 of its personnel by 1992. See id. at 427.
2. See S.C. Res. 868, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3283d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES186S (1993);
Security of United Nations Operations: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Item 87 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/48/349-S/26358 (1993).
3. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A. Res.
49/59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59 (1994), reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 482 (1995) [hereinafter Safety Convention].
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authorized by the United Nations but not under U.N. control.
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the current legal regime
for the protection of peacekeepers. The traditional "law of armed con-
flict" is reviewed and found inadequate to protect peacekeepers in cir-
cumstances where the U.N. force is not a party to the conflict. Simi-
larly, the new Safety Convention has not greatly improved the situation
because of its limited applicability. Moreover, the Convention could
have a negative impact on the law of armed conflict by indirectly rais-
ing the threshold at which the 1949 Geneva Conventions become ap-
plicable to a U.N. operation.
These issues have been addressed by Professor Walter Gary
Sharp, Sr., in his article Protecting the Avatars of International Peace
and Security.5 Professor Sharp concludes that the law of armed conflict
should not apply equally to the United Nations and that the Safety
Convention should be extended to apply to operations authorized by
the United Nations even if not under U.N. control. This Article takes
issue with Professor Sharp's conclusion on three grounds. First, the in-
ternational community continues to stand by the idea that the law of
armed conflict should apply equally to all parties. Secondly, it is not
the soldier who should be held accountable for an attack against U.N.
forces, but the government that orders that attack, and this can already
be accomplished through order of general international law. Finally, if
the principle of equal application is undermined, all respect for the
1949 Geneva Conventions6 may be destroyed.
II. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Although doubts were initially expressed about the applicability of
the law of armed conflict to U.N. operations, even where the U.N.
force in question was established expressly in order to conduct hostili-
ties on a large scale, the prevailing view today is clearly that the law of
4. See, e.g., infra note 5.
5. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7
DuKEJ. CoMP. & INT'LL. 93 (1996).
6. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1949
Geneva Convention IJ; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
1949 Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva
Convention IV].
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armed conflict applies to such situations.7 Thus, the widely respected
Institute of International Law declared in 1971 that
[t]he humanitarian rules of the law of armed conflict apply to the
United Nations as of right and they must be complied with in all
circumstances by United Nations forces which are engaged in hos-
tilities.
The rules referred to in the preceding paragraph include in par-
ticular:
(a) the rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities in general
and especially those prohibiting the use or some uses of certain
weapons, those concerning the means of injuring the other
party, and those relating to the distinction between military
and non-military objectives;
(b) the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949;
(c) the rules which aim at protecting civilian persons and prop-
erty.
8
The Institute subsequently concluded that the entirety of the law
of armed conflict, including those rules which were not specifically hu-
manitarian in character, were applicable to hostilities conducted by
U.N. forces.9 The Institute's view is supported by most authoritative
academic commentators on the subject" and reflects the practice of the
United Nations during the Korean conflict. After initial hesitation, the
Unified Command in Korea accepted that it would apply the rules of
the law of armed conflict, including those contained in the 1949 Ge-
7. See American Society of International Law, Report of the Committee on the Study of
the Legal Problems of the United Nations: Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations En-
forcement Action?, 46 PROc. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 216, 220 (1952). For a review of the literature,
see D.W. BoWErr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 484-516 (1964).
8. Institute of International Law, Resolutions and Voeux Adopted By the Institute at Its
Zagreb Session (26 August - 3 September, 1971): L Conditions of Application of Humanitarian
Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged, 54-I1
ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 465-66 (1971), reprinted in WALTER
GARY SHARP, SR., UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 138 (1995) [hereinafter Institute of
International Law].
9. Institute of International Law, Resolutions Adopted and Recommendations Made By
the Institute at its Wiesbaden Session, August 6-15, 1975:11. Conditions of Application of Rules,
Other Than Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations
Forces May Be Engaged, 56-Il ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 540
(1975), reprinted in SHARP, supra note 8, at 141.
10. See, e.g., BOwEr, supra note 7, at 503; Dietrich Schindler, United Nations Forces and
International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 521 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
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neva Conventions,1' notwithstanding that those Conventions had not
then entered into force for any of the major states contributing forces
to the United Nations Command in Korea. 2 Likewise in the Kuwait
conflict of 1990-91, where military action was authorized by the Secu-
rity Council but conducted entirely under national control, it was never
doubted that the coalition forces were subject to the law of armed con-
flict, and the coalition states on numerous occasions declared that they
had scrupulously complied with those laws. 3
The law of armed conflict encompasses the customary law of
armed conflict, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (to which all the states
likely to contribute contingents to a U.N. operation are parties), and, in
some cases, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1977
(Protocol I).' The law of armed conflict regulates most aspects of the
conduct of hostilities, limiting the type of weapons which may be
used, 5 the targets against which force may lawfully be directed, 6 and
the treatment of wounded and civilians in the power of an enemy.
17
Likewise it prohibits the use of methods and means of warfare likely to
cause unnecessary suffering and requires that captured members of en-
emy armed forces be treated humanely and in accordance with the
strict provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention Ill on the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.18
The law of armed conflict also provides a measure of protection to
U.N. personnel, with two significant limitations. First, the laws of
armed conflict make no special provision for U.N. forces. Where a
U.N. force is engaged in hostilities as a belligerent, it is treated in ex-
actly the same way as the armed forces of a state. 9 Since the United
11. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 6.
12. See BOwETr, supra note 7, at 500; see also 2 SIDNEY D. BAILEY, HOW vARS END:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND TERMINATION OF ARMED CoNFIcrs, 1946-64, at 444 (1982).
13. See Christopher Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and
the Rule of Law, 55 MOD. L. REV. 153,171-75 (1992).
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979),
16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
15. See, eg., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Protocol II, art. 8, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 171, reprinted in 19 I..L.M. 1523,
1533 (1980) [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention].
16. See, e.g., Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws of and Customs of War on Land,
Annex (Regulations), art. 23, Oct. 18,1907,36 Stat. 2295,2301, 1 Bevans 643,648.
17. See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
18. 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 6,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
19. See Institute of International Law, supra note 8.
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Nations has no permanent disciplinary system or criminal law of its
own, in practice many requirements of the law of armed conflict can be
met only by action on the part of the contributor States, rather than the
United Nations itself. Secondly, the law of armed conflict is based on
the principle that its provisions apply equally to all parties to an armed
conflict without distinction between the aggressor and the victim of ag-
gression or, in the case considered here, between the forces of the
United Nations and the forces of an aggressor state. Moreover, al-
though the law of armed conflict does not expressly confer a right to
take life in any circumstances, it operates on the assumption that killing
opposing soldiers is not unlawful under international law, provided that
the killing takes place within the constraints laid down by the various
treaties and rules of customary international law."' Thus, killing a pris-
oner of war or killing enemy soldiers with chemical weapons is a war
crime, but killing enemy soldiers in open combat with weapons not
prohibited by the law of armed conflict is not in itself an illegal act."
The law of armed conflict can also apply to peacekeeping opera-
tions if the U.N. forces become involved in fighting to such an extent
that the forces become parties to the conflict. In such a situation,
peacekeepers are subject to the law of armed conflict: they are subject
to the same degree of legal protection as any other lawful combatants.23
Thus, if captured they are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and
their murder or ill treatment would be a grave breach of the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention III, whereupon all states would have the right, and in
certain circumstances the duty, to prosecute.24 Civilian personnel at-
tached to a U.N. force would benefit from the protection of the 1949
Geneva Convention IV.2'
A more difficult case arises where U.N. peacekeepers are caught
up in an armed conflict between states and subjected to attacks by
members of one or more belligerent forces but the U.N. force does not
itself become party to an armed conflict. This case is different because
the law of armed conflict makes almost no express provision for it, ex-
20. See Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius ad Bellumn and Ius in Bello,
9 REv. INT'L STUD. 221 (1983); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of Operation of the Laws of
War, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 206,212 (1953).
21. See sources cited supra note 19.
22. See id. Professor Sharp takes issue with the application of this principle to United Na-
tions operations. See Sharp, supra note 5, at 165-74.
23. See Bowmrr, supra note 7, at 499-503.
24. 1949 Geneva Convention III, arts. 129-30, supra note 6,6 U.S.T. at 3418,75 U.N.T.S at
236.
25. 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
1996]
190 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:185
cept for indirect protection under Article 37(1)(d) of Protocol I, which
prohibits "the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems
or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other states not par-
ties to the conflict. ''H This provision clearly envisages that the United
Nations and, by extension, U.N. personnel, have some kind of
"protected status," but the nature of that status and the rights and obli-
gations which flow from it are not set out in the Protocol.
Nevertheless, it is possible to infer certain protections for non-
party U.N. peacekeepers from other provisions of Protocol I. Thus, the
parties to the conflict have a duty to respect and protect U.N. person-
nel engaged in relief operations.27 More generally, because U.N.
peacekeeping units, the civilian personnel attached to them, their
buildings, vehicles, and equipment would not constitute military objec-
tives under Articles 48 and 50-52 of Protocol I, attacks upon them by a
party to an international armed conflict are unlawful.H If taken pris-
oner, peacekeepers would, at the very least, be entitled to the funda-
mental guarantees laid down in Article 75 of the Protocol,29 and, since
these provisions of Protocol I are generally regarded as declaratory of
customary international law, it does not matter whether or not the bel-
ligerents are parties to Protocol I0 In addition, the United Nations
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons gives members of U.N. peacekeeping and observa-
tion forces a degree of protection from land mines.31
26. Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 37(1)(d), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 1.L.M. at 1409. It is
clear from the travaux prdparatoires of the Protocol that this provision was not intended to ap-
ply to situations in which U.N. forces were engaged as combatants on one side of an armed con-
flict, but only to genuine cases of peacekeeping. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1509 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
27. See Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 69-71, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 35,16 I.L.M. at 1422.
28. See id, art. 48,50-52,1125 U.N.T.S at 25,16 LL.M. at 1412-13.
29. Ild. art. 75,1125 U.N.T.S. at 37,16 I.L.M. at 1423.
30. See Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols,
in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLCT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 93, 112-13 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
31. Article 8 provides as follows:
Protection of United Nations forces and missions from the effects of minefields, mines
and booby-traps
1. When the United Nations force or mission performs functions of peacekeeping, ob-
servation or similar functions in any area, each party to the conflict shall, if requested
by the head of the United Nations force or mission in that area, as far as it is able:
(a) remove or render harmless all mines or booby-traps in that area;
(b) take such measures as may be necessary to protect the force or mission from the
effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps while carrying out its duties; and
(c) make available to the head of the United Nations force or mission in that area, all
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Similarly, where a U.N. peacekeeping force is embroiled in fight-
ing which constitutes an internal, rather than an international, armed
conflict, a limited degree of protection is implicit in the rules of interna-
tional law applicable to civil wars. Thus, members of a U.N. force em-
broiled in an internal armed conflict would be "persons taking no ac-
tive part in the hostilities" for the purposes of Article 3(1) common to
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.32 As a result of that provision, the
parties to the conflict must treat peacekeepers humanely and are for-
bidden to commit acts of violence against them or take them hostage.3
The massacre of members of the United Nations Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in April 1994 during the Rwandan civil war
was thus a clear example of a violation of common Article 3 .' If the
state in which the conflict is taking place is a party to Additional Proto-
col II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol II), both govern-
ment and rebel forces have more detailed obligations.35 Many of these
obligations, such as the fundamental guarantees set forth in Article 4 of
Protocol HI,3' and the provision on persons whose liberty has been re-
information in the party's possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and
booby-traps in that area.
2. When a United Nations fact finding mission performs functions in any area, any
party to the conflict concerned shall provide protection to that mission, except where,
because of the size of such mission, it cannot adequately provide such protection. In
that case it shall make available to the head of the mission the information in its pos-
session concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in that area.
Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 15, art. 8, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at
1533.
32. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 6, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3116,75 U.N.T.S. at 32;
1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 6, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; 1949
Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136; 1949 Ge-
neva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3518,75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
33. See iL
34. The Security Council, in condemning the attacks on U.N. personnel in Rwanda,
treated those attacks as a violation of international humanitarian law, which, in this context,
was clearly a reference to common Article 3. See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3368th
mtg., para. 5, U.N. Doc. SIRES/912 (1994).
35. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I1), Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609,16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
36. Article 4 states in relevant part:
1.All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostili-
ties, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their
person, honor and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that
there shall be no survivors.
2.Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the
persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation, or any
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stricted set forth in Article 5 of Protocol H,37 would also confer protec-
tion upon members of a U.N. force caught up in the fighting. Even if
the state in question is not a party to Protocol II, it is arguable that the
guarantees in Articles 4 and 5 of that treaty are declarations of custom-
ary law and thus of general application.8
While these provisions give a measure of protection to U.N.
peacekeepers in circumstances where the U.N. force cannot be re-
garded as a party to a conflict and thus is not subject to the law of
armed conflict in its entirety, they cannot be regarded as constituting a
satisfactory legal regime. In many cases, the status of the peacekeepers
form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages against personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Id. art. 4,1125 U.N.T.S. at 612,16 I.L.M. at 1444.
37. Protocol II, art. 5 states in relevant part:
1. In addition, to the provisions of Article 4, the following provisions shall be re-
spected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons re-
lated to the armed conflict, whether or not they are interned or detained:
(b) the persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same extent as the local
civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded
safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the
climate and the dangers of the armed conflict;
(e) they shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and safe-
guards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population.
2. Those who are responsible for the internment or detention of the persons referred
to in paragraph 1 shall also, within the limits of their capabilities, respect the following
provisions relating to such persons:
(a) expect when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women
shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the im-
mediate supervision of women;
(b) they shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the number of
which may be limited by competent authority if it deems necessary;
(c) places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat
zone. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the places
where they are interned or detained become particularly exposed to danger aris-
ing out of the armed conflict, if their evacuation can be carried out under ade-
quate conditions of safety;
(d) they shall have the benefit of medical examinations;
(e) their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by any
unjustified act or omission .... Id. art. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 612-13, 16 I.L.M. at
1444-45.
38. See Greenwood, supra note 30, at 112-13.
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may be ambiguous. In Somalia, for example, the members of the
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the Unified Task
Force (UNITAF), and the national forces associated with them could
no longer be characterized as "persons taking no active part in the hos-
tilities" pursuant to 1949 Geneva Conventions common Article 3 once
they began initiating operations against one of the factions in the So-
mali conflict in an attempt to arrest its leader and became involved in
heavy fighting 9 Even where the status of the U.N. personnel is une-
quivocally that of peacekeepers not involved in the hostilities, the rules
outlined in the previous two paragraphs are insufficiently detailed and
precise to provide adequate protection, even in an environment in
which the parties to the conflict are disposed to observe the law. In
particular, members of such a force who are taken prisoner by one of
the parties to the conflict would not normally have the status of pro-
tected persons under either 1949 Geneva Convention III or IV.' In
these circumstances, therefore, U.N. personnel taken prisoner by one
of the parties to an armed conflict would not benefit from the detailed
regime of protection in 1949 Geneva Conventions III and IV, and of-
39. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to
Casualties Among Them, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19941653 (1994).
40. See 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 4, 6 U.T.S. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138; 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 4, 6 U.T.S. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
Professor Sharp argues that members of the armed forces of states not a party to a conflict op-
erating in areas of armed conflict are protected persons under 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
See Sharp, supra note 5, at 122-23. He bases this conclusion on passages in the International
Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention describing the
Conventions as embodying a comprehensive regime. See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION].
However, Article 4 of 1949 Geneva Convention IV, which specifies who are protected persons
under that Convention, provides that "nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the
territory of a belligerent state.., shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they
are." 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 4, 6 U.T.S. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
This provision will normally, though not invariably, serve to exclude members of a United Na-
tions force from the status of protected person under 1949 Geneva Convention IV, since
United Nations personnel will usually be drawn from countries which have normal diplomatic
representation with the state parties to the armed conflict. Thus, for example, members of
UNIFIL caught up in the armed conflict between Israel, Lebanon and Syria in Lebanese terri-
tory in 1982 were in most cases nationals of states which had normal diplomatic relations with
all three of the countries involved. See ROBERT C.R. SEIKMANN, NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES 41-42, 76 (1991). Notwithstanding the passages in
the ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, therefore, these personnel would not
have been protected persons under 1949 Geneva Convention IV if they had fallen into the
hands of one of the belligerent parties.
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fenses committed against them would not constitute grave breaches of
those Conventions, since only offenses committed against protected
persons fall within the definition of a grave breach in Articles 129-30 of
1949 Geneva Convention III and Articles 146-47 of 1949 Geneva Con-
vention IV!'
III. THE 1994 CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF UNITED
NATIONS AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL
Concern over the attacks on U.N. personnel in Somalia, the for-
mer Yugoslavia, and Rwanda led to the adoption in 1994 of the Con-
vention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
(Safety Convention).42 Because this Convention has been analyzed in
detail elsewhere,43 this Article will focus only upon the extent of the
application of the convention, particularly important because its provi-
sions mark a radical departure from the approach of the law of armed
conflict."
Unlike the law of armed conflict, the Safety Convention was spe-
cifically tailored to meet the needs of the United Nations and aims to
outlaw all attacks upon U.N. forces.45 Where the Safety Convention
applies, Article 7 prohibits any attack upon United Nations and associ-
ated personnel, their equipment and premises, as well as any action
that prevents them from discharging their mandate. All states which
are parties to the Safety Convention are required to take appropriate
measures to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and asso-
41. On the relationship between the grave breaches provisions and the definition of pro-
tected persons under the 1949 Geneva Conventions III and IV, see the decision of the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996). See also Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitar-
ian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265 (1996).
42. Safety Convention, supra note 3, at 2-3 (the Security Council was "[djeeply concerned
over the growing number of deaths and injuries resulting from deliberate attacks against
United Nations and associated personnel... [and] [c/onvinced that there is an urgent need to
adopt appropriate and effective measures for the prevention of attacks committed against
United Nations and associated personnel and for the punishment of those who have committed
such attacks").
43. See Sharp, supra note 5, at 145-56. See also Evan T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers:
The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
621 (1995); M. Christiana Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Convention on the Safety of United Na-
tions and Associated Personnel, 44 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 560 (1995).
44. See Safety Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(1), 34 I.L.M. at 486 ("This Convention shall
not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement
action... in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed
forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.").
45. See iL
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ciated personnel, especially when deployed on their territory. 6 Article
8 imposes a duty to release or return United Nations and associated
personnel who have been captured or detained. Furthermore, Article
9 requires all states which are parties to make the intentional commis-
sion of various attacks and hostile acts against United Nations or asso-
ciated personnel crimes under their national law, in addition to their
general duty to either extradite or try those accused of such offenses.47
In determining the scope of its application, three provisions of the
Safety Convention are especially important. First, the Safety Conven-
tion applies only with respect to a "United Nations operation."'  This
term is defined in a restrictive way by Article 1(c) which provides that
"United Nations operation" means an operation established by the
competent organ of the United Nations in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and conducted under United Na-
tions authority and control:
(i)Where the operation is for the purpose of maintaining or re-
storing international peace and security; or
(ii)Where the Security Council or the General Assembly has
declared, for the purposes of this Convention, that there exists
an exceptional risk to the safety of the personnel participating
in the operation.4
9
The Safety Convention thus applies only to those forces which op-
erate under the authority and control of the United Nations; operations
authorized by the United Nations but controlled by individual member
states or groups of member states, or by regional organizations, are ex-
cluded. Had the Safety Convention been in force at the time, the coali-
tion operation in Kuwait and the French operation in Rwanda,' both
of which were authorized by the United Nations Security Council but
operated under the control of national authorities, would have fallen
outside its scope. The same is true of the operation conducted in Libe-
46. Id. art. 7(2), 34 I.L.M. at 488.
47. See id. art. 10, 34 I.L.M. at 488-89 (using terms which are modelled upon anti-terrorism
conventions such as The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,1971,24 U.S.T. 565,974 U.N.T.S. 177).
48. Id. art. 2(1), 34 I.L.M. at 486.
49. Id. art. 1(c), 34 I.L.M. at 486.
50. See S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994)
(authorizing the French operation in Rwanda which was conducted under national command
and was entirely separate from the U.N. operation); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990) (authorizing the coalition operation in Kuwait).
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ria by the regional organization ECOWAS.'
A more complicated limitation is that the Safety Convention ap-
plies only to certain types of United Nations operations. Article 1(c)
divides United Nations operations into two categories: those to which
the Convention will apply automatically and those to which it will
apply only if the Security Council or the General Assembly has made
a declaration of exceptional risk. The limitation of the "automatic
category" to operations which are for the purpose of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security, suggests at first sight that
this category is limited to operations established by the Security
Council and operating under Chapter VII of the Charter, since the
language used in Article 1(c)(i) echoes the language of Article 39 of
the Charter. However, to interpret Article 1(c)(i) in this way would
mean that most traditional peacekeeping operations, which are not
established under Chapter VII but which rely upon the consent of the
host state, such as the United Nations Emergency Force in the Mid-
dle East, UNIFIL in Lebanon or the United Nations Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP), would not be covered by the Safety Convention unless
there had been a declaration of exceptional risk to personnel. It is
difficult to see why the Convention should be limited in such a way
and Bloom suggests that all peacekeeping operations would fall
within the automatic category 2 presumably because all peacekeeping
operations are concerned with international peace and security. That
would mean the second category was designed to cover such opera-
tions as humanitarian missions and election monitoring missions
where there was an exceptional risk to the safety of U.N. personnel.53
The difficulty with this interpretation is that unless an operation has
been established under Chapter VII of the Charter, it is not immedi-
ately obvious from the resolutions which establish it that its purpose
is to restore international peace and security. This is likely to prove a
fertile area for argument in the future.
Secondly, the Safety Convention applies to a wide range of per-
sonnel involved in such an operation. According to Article 1(a) and
(b), the Safety Convention applies not only to U.N. personnel but also
to associated personnel, defined in Article 1(b) as:
51. See S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/REs/788 (1992);
Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/23886 (1992); Note by
the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/22133 (1991).
52. Bloom, supra note 43, at 623.
53. Accord Bourloyannis-Brailas, supra, note 43, at 566-69.
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(i) Persons assigned by a Government or an intergovernmental
organization with the agreement of the competent organ of the
United Nations;
(ii) Persons engaged by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations or by a specialized agency or by the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
(iii) Persons deployed by a humanitarian non-governmental
organization or agency under an agreement with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations or with a specialized agency or
with the International Atomic Energy Agency
to carry out activities and supgort the fulfilment of a mandate of the
United Nations operation ....
The definition of associated personnel is wide enough, therefore,
to include NATO air crews involved in support of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as they were
persons assigned by a government with the agreement of the compe-
tent organ of the United Nations to carry out activities and support the
fulfilment of UNPROFOR's mandate, notwithstanding that they oper-
ated under NATO command and control.' In contrast, the personnel
of the Multi-National Implementation Force (IFOR), which took over
responsibility from UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the
terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement, would not be covered, because
IFOR does not operate under United Nations' control. 6
Finally, Article 2(2) of the Convention imposes a most important
limitation on the Convention's scope of application, by providing that
[t]his Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation
authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of
the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed
forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.
57
This provision was designed to ensure that the legal regimes of the
Safety Convention and the laws of armed conflict were mutually exclu-
54. Safety Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(b), 34 I.L.M. at 486.
55. See S.C. Res. 958, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3461st mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/958 (1994);
S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/836 (1993).
56. See S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. at para. 14, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1031 (1995) (authorizing Member States, acting through NATO, or in cooperation with
NATO, to establish the IFOR). The States concerned had already agreed to establish and de-
ploy IFOR when they concluded the Dayton Peace Agreement. See General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. S.C. Doc. S119951999, Annex (1995).'
57. Safety Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487.
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sive. As one of those involved in the drafting of the Convention ex-
plained, "[t]he negotiators realized that it was necessary to have a clear
separation between the new legal regime under the instrument being
drafted and the Geneva Conventions, so that U.N. and associated per-
sonnel and those who attack them would be covered under one regime
or the other, but not both."58
Although criticized by some commentators,59 the basic principle
underlying Article 2(2) is entirely understandable. Nevertheless, partly
because of the way in which the provision is drafted, and partly due to
problems of a wider nature, any attempt to draw a line between those
U.N. operations to which the law of armed conflict applies and those
which are subject to the new Safety Convention, is far from straight-
forward. The first problem is that Article 2(2) does not make the two
legal regimes mutually exclusive. Article 2(2) excludes the application
of the Safety Convention only in respect of "a United Nations opera-
tion authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under
Chapter VII of the Charter."'' While most of the operations in which
U.N. personnel become engaged as combatants against organized
armed forces are likely to fall under Chapter VII of the Charter, that
will not always be the case. Even a force established by the Security
Council or the General Assembly without reference to Chapter VII of
the Charter is entitled to use force in self-defense.6 The United Na-
tions has traditionally interpreted this right of self-defense very
broadly, so as to justify not only the use of force to protect United Na-
tions and associated personnel and property from attacks, but also to
justify the use of force in response to armed resistance to the discharge
of the force's mandate.62 A peacekeeping force which exercized this
right of self-defense might well find itself engaged in protracted hostili-
ties with organized armed forces, which would be subject to the law of
armed conflict.' The Safety Convention would, however, also apply."
58. Bloom, supra note 43, at 625.
59. See Sharp, supra note 5, at 158.
60. Safety Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487 (emphasis added).
61. See BowErr, supra note 7, at 200-03. For a recent assertion of the principle, see Report
of the Secretary General on the Situation in Rwanda, para. 15, U.N. S.C. Doe. S/1994/565 (1994).
62. See the discussion of self-defense in repect of U.N. operations in the Congo in the early
1960s in BowErr, supra note 7, at 200-03.
63. See BOwErr, supra note 7, at 486,503.
64. The applicability of the Safety Convention does not affect the operation of the laws of
armed conflict. Article 20(a) of the Safety Convention provides that
Nothing in this Convention shall affect:
(a) The applicability of international humanitarian law and universally recog-
nized standards of human rights as contained in international instruments in rela-
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Moreover, Article 2(2) only removes an operation from the scope
of the Safety Convention in a case where personnel are engaged as
combatants in a situation to which the law of international armed con-
flict applies. Where the members of the U.N. force or associated per-
sonnel become embroiled in an internal armed conflict, it is arguable
that their involvement is not subject to the law of international armed
conflict because the entity against which they are using force is not it-
self a state. Such was the case in Somalia.6 In many of the countries to
which United Nations forces have been deployed in recent years, the
dividing line between internal and international armed conflicts has
been extremely difficult to determine. For example, it is arguable that
in Haiti, any fighting between members of the U.N. force and the
forces of the military junta which the United Nations sought to displace
would have constituted hostilities between the U.N. force and the then
government of Haiti, and would therefore have been an international
armed conflict. In contrast, in Somalia, fighting between the support-
ers of General Aideed and the United Nations would not have been so
characterized, because Aideed's faction was not even the de facto gov-
ernment of Somalia.66 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia held that the hostilities had both internal and international as-
pects.67 The difficulty in determining whether a particular conflict in-
volving U.N. forces should be characterized as internal or international
is not one for which the drafters of Article 2(2) can be blamed, but it is
likely to make the application of that provision much more difficult.
A more fundamental problem with Article 2(2) is that it makes
the application of the laws of international armed conflict one of the
conditions for the Safety Convention ceasing to apply. The threshold
for the applicability of the law of international armed conflict thus be-
tion to the protection of United Nations operations and United Nations and asso-
ciated personnel or the responsibility of such personnel to respect such laws and
standards ....
Safety Convention, supra note 3, art. 20(a), 34 I.L.M. at 491.
65. It has, however, been argued that once armed forces from outside a state become in-
volved in fighting within that state, even where they are fighting against a non-state entity, their
involvement necessarily internationalizes the conflict and brings into operation the entire body
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other rules applicable to international armed conflict.
This approach appears to have been taken, for example, by the International Committee of the
Red Cross on a number of occasions and by the United Nations itself in the Congo conflict in
the early 1960s. See Bowmr, supra note 7, at 509-10.
66. Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse, Drake and Carey [1993] Q.B. 54 (the High Court
in England concluded, in March 1992, that there was no government in Somalia), reprinted in
94 I.L.R. 608 (1993).
67. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 55 (1996).
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comes the ceiling for the operation of the Safety Convention. The
trend of the last fifty years has been to make the threshold for the ap-
plication of the laws of international armed conflict as low as possible.
Common Article 2(1) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that
the Conventions "shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the high
contracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them."' This provision is widely regarded as determining not only
when the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply, but also when the custom-
ary law of international armed conflict comes into operation.69 The ap-
plication of the laws of armed conflict is, therefore, no longer depend-
ent on the existence of a state of war." The term "armed conflict,"
which is not defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, has generally
been given a very broad interpretation. Thus, the widely respected
commentary on the 1949 Geneva Conventions published by the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross states that
[a]ny difference arising between two states and leading to the inter-
vention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within
the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the parties denies the exis-
tence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict
lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to the
human person as such is not measured by the number of victims.7
There is some support in state practice for this view. For example,
when a United States Navy pilot, Lieutenant Goodman, was shot down
and captured by Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1983, the United States
treated the brief exchange in which this incident had occured as an
armed conflict between the United States and Syria and claimed pris-
oner of war status for the pilot.' A State Department press release
68. 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3316,75 U.N.T.S. at 32;
1949 Geneva Convention II, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; 1949
Geneva Convention III, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136; 1949 Ge-
neva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 2(1), 6 U.S.T. at 3518,75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
69. See, e.g., WAR OFFICE (UNITED KINGDOM), THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND: BEING
PART III OF THE MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 1 7 (1958); Christopher Greenwood, Scope of
Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CON-
Fucrs 39, 39-44 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
70. See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 283 (1987).
71. ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 20-
21.
72 See 3 CUMULATIVE DIGEsT OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1981-88, at
3456 (Marian Nash (Leich) ed., 1989) [hereinafter CUMULATIVE DIGEST].
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stated that "'[a]rmed' conflict includes any situation in which there is
hostile action between the armed forces of two parties, regardless of
the duration, intensity or scope of the fighting .... ." The more sub-
stantial, though still shortlived, U.S. operations in Grenada in 1983 and
Panama in 1989 were also treated by the United States as armed con-
flicts to which the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other rules of the law
of armed conflict applied.74
Hitherto there has never been any suggestion that the level of
violence required to constitute an armed conflict between the U.N.
force and the forces of a state is any different from that which consti-
tutes an armed conflict between the forces of two opposing states. If
one applies the definition in the International Red Cross Commen-
tary75 to U.N. operations, as soon as the members of a U.N. force be-
come involved in hostilities with the forces of a state, an armed conflict
between them comes into being and the law of international armed
conflict becomes applicable. The duration and intensity of the hostili-
ties would be irrelevant, except perhaps in the sense that low level,
isolated incidents, such as an exchange of fire by sentries, would not
constitute an armed conflict. That approach would mean, however,
that the operations carried out by the United Nations and NATO in
support of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were certainly
sufficient to constitute an armed conflict between the United Nations
and the Bosnian Serbs.' It follows that the law of international armed
conflict applied to those hostilities, unless the armed conflict was not of
an international character because the Bosnian Serb entity was not a
state. It would be difficult to reconcile this approach with many of the
public statements made by states involved in both the NATO and
UNPROFOR operations about the nature of the armed conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the law to be applied by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.' Even if it could be ar-
73. Id. at 3457.
74. On Grenada, see W. HAYS PARKS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MEMORANDUM FOR
THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, STATUS OF ENEMY PERSONNEL CAPTURED DURING OPERATION
URGENT FURY in 3 CUMULATIVE DIGEST. 1981-88, supra note 72, at 3452-56. On Panama, see
United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791,795 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
75. See ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 40, at
20-21.
76. Those operations included sustained NATO air strikes against targets in Bosnian Serb-
held areas on several occasions, and also some heavy fighting by UNPROFOR ground troops.
77. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal discussed this issue at length in Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996). In that case it was argued that the Security Council had
characterized the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as an international armed conflict in its en-
tirety. While that argument was rejected by the Appeals Chamber, the Appeals Chamber did
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gued that only the NATO airstrikes and not the ground operations by
UNPROFOR itself reached the level of an armed conflict, that would
not be sufficient to prevent Article 2(2) from removing the protection
of the Safety Convention from UNPROFOR personnel, since Article
2(2) applies to the entirety of a United Nations operation if any of the
personnel involved operate as combatants against organized armed
forces in circumstances to which the law of international armed conflict
applies.78
It is highly unlikely, however, that the drafters of the Safety Con-
vention intended that the Safety Convention should not apply to at-
tacks on U.N. personnel and associated personnel in a situation such as
that in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, it seems likely that the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was precisely what the draftsman had
in mind.79 It is highly likely, therefore, that the desire to retain the ap-
plicability of the Safety Convention in situations such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina will lead to a subtle raising of the threshold for the appli-
cation of the law of international armed conflict, at least in cases in
which the United Nations is involved. A degree of violence which, in
the past, would certainly have been regarded as sufficient to constitute
an international armed conflict will come to be regarded as something
of a lesser nature if it involves U.N. forces. Such a development risks
causing serious damage to the progress which has been made in wid-
ening the sphere of application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the other rules of the international law of armed conflict since the end
of World War II.
IV. A RECONSIDERATION OF THE PLACE OF UNITED
NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT?
In his article Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Se-
curity,'o Professor Sharp argues for a fundamental reconsideration of
the place of U.N. forces in the law of armed conflict and of the scope of
application of the Safety Convention. Professor Sharp argues that the
principle of equality of application, that is, the principle that the law of
armed conflict applies equally to all the parties to an armed conflict ir-
respective of who is the aggressor, should not include the United Na-
not exclude the possibility that at least some of the fighting which took place between Bosnian
Serbs and the Bosnian government was subject to the law of international armed conflict. Id. at
57.
78. See Safety Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(2), 34 I.L.M. at 487.
79. Bloom expressly gives Bosnia as an example of a situation to which the Safety Conven-
tion would have applied had it entered into force in time. See Bloom, supra note 43, at 623.
80. Sharp, supra note 5.
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tions.81 To do so, he maintains, is to accept as lawful attacks upon
members of U.N. forces, whom he sees as analogous to police officers
in a domestic setting.' Since one would never accept that it was lawful
to use lethal force against police officers and would reject any sugges-
tion that the police officer and the criminal should be treated on an
equal footing, why should one accept that the use of force against U.N.
personnel is legitimate in international law? Professor Sharp argues
that even when the United Nations takes enforcement action against a
state and sends forces to engage in large-scale hostilities (as it did in
Korea), any acts of violence against the members of that force should
be regarded as criminal under international law." He therefore pro-
poses that the limitation in Article 2(2) of the Safety Convention be
removed. 4 Indeed, he argues that the Safety Convention should be ex-
tended to operations authorized by the United Nations even if they are
not under United Nations control.? Had Professor Sharp's views rep-
resented the law at the time of the Kuwait conflict, the result would
have been that members of the Iraqi armed forces who committed acts
of violence against coalition military personnel would have been guilty
of a crime against international law, even if they had acted within the
scope of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the other laws of armed
conflict.
It is important to understand that Professor Sharp is not arguing
that his views represent the current state of international law. Moreo-
ver, he does not argue that the law of armed conflict is inapplicable to
U.N. forces engaged in hostilities. Under his proposal, such forces
would still be required to conduct their own operations in accordance
with the law of armed conflict, but the equality of application, one of
the essential features of the law of armed conflict, would be lost: it
would be lawful for coalition military personnel to kill an Iraqi soldier,
but unlawful for an Iraqi soldier to kill coalition military personnel.
There is considerable logical force to Professor Sharp's argument.
The principle that the laws of armed conflict apply equally to both par-
ties to an armed conflict, irrespective of who is the aggressor, is difficult
to reconcile with the general legal principle ex injuria non oitur jus. 6
81. See id. at 165.
82. See id. at 96.
83. See id. at 163-67.
84. See id. at 158.
85. See id. at 157-58.
86. "An unlawful act cannot give rise to a legal right on the part of the actor" (author's
translation).
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While the difficulty of determining in many cases which state is the ag-
gressor and which the victim of aggression might justify the principle of
equal application in conflicts between states, the principle underlying
Professor Sharp's proposal must surely be that the United Nations,
representing the international community as a whole, stands on a dif-
ferent footing, so that any use of force against its representatives
should be illegal.
Despite its apparent logic, Professor Sharp's theory is a dangerous
one which is open to criticism on several grounds. First, the principle
of equal application has been reaffirmed by the international commu-
nity on numerous occasions since resort to aggressive war was out-
lawed. For example, in several of the war crimes trials which took
place after World War II, it was argued by the prosecution that since
the Axis powers were guilty of aggression in initiating war against their
neighbors, they could not then take advantage of the provisions of the
jus in bello and derive rights therefrom.' That argument was decisively
rejected in all of the principal war crimes trials in which it was ad-
vanced.' Again, during and immediately after the Vietnam War, it was
argued by North Vietnam that an aggressor was not entitled to benefit
from the laws of armed conflict, yet at the 1974-77 Diplomatic Confer-
ence on Humanitarian Law, that view attracted no support at all: Pro-
tocol I reaffirmed, in its Preamble, the principle that "the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions... and of this Protocol must be fully applied
in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instru-
ments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of
the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the
parties to the conflict." s9
Secondly, Professor Sharp's analogy between the United Nations
and the police in a domestic society is not as exact as one might wish.
International society does not replicate the features of a national com-
munity and the United Nations does not at this stage command the de-
gree of support and respect for its authority which is accorded to the
organs of government within most national societies. In these circum-
stances, to treat members of a state's armed forces who take up arms
under the orders of their government to resist forces controlled or
authorized by the United Nations as criminals is unjust and unaccept-
87. See, eg., United States v. List, 15 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 632 (1948);
In re Krupp, 15 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 620 (1948); United States v. Von Leeb,
15 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 376 (1948).
88. See cases cited supra note 87.
89. See Protocol I, supra note 14,1125 U.N.T.S. at 7,16 I.L.M. at 1396.
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able unless they commit acts which would be violations of the 1949
Geneva Conventions or other rules of international law. That is not to
say, however, that the state which employs force against the United
Nations should not be penalized for doing so. Such action is a violation
of a state's duties under the U.N. Charter and general international
law, and there is no reason why the state should not be subject to some
kind of penalty for its wrongful act, just as Iraq was penalized for its il-
legal acts in invading Kuwait and causing the conflict which ensued
with the coalition forces." Similarly, it would not be unreasonable to
impose criminal responsibility upon the individual members of the
state's leadership who were responsible for taking these decisions,
much as the Nuremberg Tribunal held the highest ranking members of
the German leadership responsible for crimes against the peace after
World War Hl."' Both the Nuremberg Tribunal and later war crimes
trials, however, rejected the argument that a similar liability for crimes
against the peace should extend down the chain of command.'
Finally, from a pragmatic standpoint, the principle of causal appli-
cation should be maintained as a powerful inducement to compliance
with the law, because everyone whose action is constrained by the law
also receives the benefit of that law's protection. To depart from that
principle would be likely to undermine respect for the law. As Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht, who was initially skeptical about the application
of the principle of equality in the United Nations Charter era, put it
more than forty years ago, "[i]t is impossible to visualize the conduct of
hostilities in which one side would be bound by rules of warfare with-
out benefiting from them and the other side would benefit from rules
of warfare without being bound by them."'93 Professor Sharp's proposal
does not go as far as the one that Lauterpacht was rejecting, since Pro-
90. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)
(imposing a variety of penalties on Iraq, ranging from a finding of responsibility for the damage
caused by military operations conducted by both sides during the conflict, to a requirement that
Iraq dismantle part of its military capabilities).
91. See JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE TRIAL OF GERMAN
WAR CIMINALS, CMD. 6964, (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946) [hereinafter JUDGMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRmUNAL].
92. Thus, in United States v. Von Leeb, supra note 87, a United States military tribunal
rejected the argument that members of the German High Command were guilty of crimes
against the peace, since their actions were confined to implementing decisions taken by Hitler's
inner circle. The International Military Tribunal acquitted Speer, the German armaments
minister of crimes against the peace for the same reason. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 91, at 130-31.
93. Lauterpacht, supra note 20, at 212. For Lauterpacht's earlier views, see 2 OPPEN-
HEIlM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-22 (7th ed. 1952).
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fessor Sharp would still hold U.N. forces bound by the laws of armed
conflict and would only seek to add a principle that those who commit
acts of violence against them are guilty of a crime. 4 But the effect of
Professor Sharp's proposal would nonetheless be to destroy the princi-
ple of equal application. If any attack on U.N. personnel by any means
whatsoever is a crime for which an ordinary soldier can be prosecuted
in any country in the world, then it is difficult to see what inducement
there is for such persons to comply with the requirements of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the law on weaponry, or any of the other princi-
ples of the law of armed conflict.
In short, there is a grave danger that Professor Sharp's proposal to
criminalize all attacks on U.N. personnel or forces authorized by the
United Nations, even where those forces are engaged in fighting a war
on the scale of that against Iraq, would be widely perceived as unjust
and encourage an approach that one might as well be hanged for a
sheep as a lamb. If that were the case, it is difficult to see how this pro-
posal would enhance the protection of peacemakers. That this risk is
real is shown by the readiness with which those who had responsibility
for protecting personnel fighting on behalf of the United Nations in
Korea and Kuwait accepted that they were subject to the same princi-
ples of international law as their adversaries, in part because they were
concerned to ensure that their own personnel received the treatment
required by the law of armed cQnflict.'
V. CONCLUSION
The development of a satisfactory legal regime which offers ade-
quate protection to those who risk their lives to keep the peace on be-
half of the international community is a matter of the utmost impor-
tance. At present, the legal regime is confused and in many respects
unsatisfactory. However, three elements can be discerned.
First, the status of U.N. forces under the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and the law of armed conflict is in many respects unclear, except
where those forces are engaged as combatants on one side in a conflict
such as that in Korea or Kuwait. In that case, the present state of in-
ternational law (as Professor Sharp agrees) is that U.N. forces are sub-
ject to the laws of armed conflict in the same way and to the same ex-
tent as any other armed forces. In particular, the law applies equally to
the U.N. forces and the forces against which they are engaged.
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Secondly, where U.N. forces are not engaged as combatants on
one side in an armed conflict, it is nevertheless possible to deduce some
elements of protection from the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, other international agreements and the customary interna-
tional law applicable to armed conflicts. In most cases, however, that
protection is not tailored to the specific situation of U.N. forces but re-
lies upon an application to them of broader general principles. The re-
sult is unsatisfactory, since the legal regime concerned is insufficiently
detailed and in some respects does not adapt well to the needs of U.N.
peacekeepers or the circumstances in which they operate.
Thirdly, the new Safety Convention adds an important level of
protection for U.N. forces and associated personnel who become
caught up in an internal or international armed conflict and are made
the target of acts of violence. However, the application of the Safety
Convention is likely to prove extremely difficult in those cases in which
U.N. forces or associated personnel become involved in fighting, but
where it is not clear that they have become engaged as combatants in
an international armed conflict. The application of the limitation in
Article 2(2) of the Safety Convention will require great care if the re-
sult is not to be significantly to weaken both the protection of the
Safety Convention and the protection offered by the law of armed con-
flict.
While Professor Sharp and I agree that there are serious deficien-
cies in the existing legal regime, I do not believe that the answer lies in
making a radical departure from the principle that the laws of armed
conflict apply equally to both parties in an armed conflict. In particu-
lar, I believe it would not be realistic to criminalize all acts of violence
against U.N. forces or forces authorized by the United Nations, in cir-
cumstances where those forces are engaged in fighting a war. To do so
would be likely to weaken, rather than enhance, the protection which
the law affords.
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